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INTRODUCTION 
 
Interconnection of telecommunications networks was mandated by the 
Telecommunications Act of 1934 and has been a continuing feature of the 
regulatory environment in the United States and in public switched 
telecommunications networks all over the world. Interconnection was 
mandated because of the glaring divergence between private and public 
interests as telecommunications evolved in the last two decades of the 19th 
century and the first two decades of the 20th century. During this period, after 
the expiration of the original Bell patents, AT&T developed a monopoly 
long-distance network while a plethora of local telecommunications 
companies (independents) emerged so that in the early 1920s more local lines 
belonged to the independents than to AT&T.1 AT&T leveraged its monopoly 
bottleneck in long-distance and refused to interconnect independent local 
telecommunications companies to its long-distance network unless they 
became part of the Bell System, which essentially meant unless they were 
acquired. The wisdom of the regulatory rule of mandatory interconnection 
lies in that it helps eliminate foreclosure arising from a bottleneck of a part of 
the network. Mandatory interconnection helps society to reap the full benefits 
of network effects of the interconnected network rather than the much smaller 
network effects2 of its constituent disconnected parts.3  
The possibility of foreclosure of competitors is obvious in a one-sided 
bottleneck such as the one that AT&T possessed at the end of the 19th 
century. However, the possibility of foreclosure also arises in a more subtle 
2 The economics of digital markets 
way in a world of two-sided bottlenecks where each telephone company 
possesses a bottleneck but also requires the use of the opponents’ bottleneck 
to provide end-to-end services. Suppose, for example, that two companies 
(local exchange carriers) provide local telecommunications services in New 
York City and each consumer subscribes to only one telephone company. 
Each local exchange carrier (LEC) possesses a bottleneck that is required by 
the competing company to complete calls across networks, when the 
originating party and the terminating party subscribe to different LECs. The 
dependence of each company on the others’ network, at a first glance, may 
seem to provide equal negotiating power to each network, and therefore 
eliminate the possibility of foreclosure at an unregulated market equilibrium. 
This conjecture is incorrect. In this chapter, it is shown that, in the absence of 
regulation, a local telecommunications company with significant market 
share can set interconnection fees so that a local rival is foreclosed at the 
unregulated market equilibrium. Briefly, foreclosure of rivals is achieved by 
the imposition by a dominant firm of high termination fees, which are the 
fees that rivals have to pay to the dominant firm to have calls terminate in the 
dominant firms’ network. Imposition of such high fees increases the cost (and 
price) of calls originating from a rival network and terminating in the 
dominant network. Since such calls represent the lion’s share of the rival’s 
calls, their high prices put the rival at a competitive disadvantage compared 
to the dominant firm. Thus, consumers prefer to subscribe to the dominant 
network and rivals are foreclosed. 
This is not just a theoretical result. In the deregulated environment of New 
Zealand where interconnection fees are privately negotiated and hotly 
contested, Telecom New Zealand (the incumbent dominant carrier) has set 
interconnection fees so that entrants were foreclosed.4 As the United States, 
the European Union and most of the rest of the world are progressively 
deregulating telecommunications markets, it is obviously important to avoid 
full deregulation where it leads to publicly undesirable outcomes, such as 
foreclosure. Since the general effects of deregulation in stimulating 
competition and improving efficiency are desirable, it would be useful to 
have a particular regulatory rule which, in the presence of an otherwise 
deregulated environment, would eliminate anti-competitive behaviour. In this 
chapter, such a regulatory rule is presented: reciprocity of termination fees. 
This rule imposes the restriction that the termination fee set by Network 1 is 
equal to the termination fee set by the Network 2, provided that costs to 
terminate calls are equal in the two networks. It is shown that this rule 
eliminates foreclosure equilibria. When the two networks have different 
costs, the appropriate regulatory rule is shown to impose the requirement that 
termination price to cost margins are equal in the two networks (symmetric 
reciprocity in mark-ups). These results underscore the wisdom of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 that mandates that interconnection fees be 
based on reciprocal terms.5 The issue of termination pricing also arises in 
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mobile networks where in early years termination fees were high. Given the 
fact that in many cases costs differ across mobile networks (for example, 
because they have increasing returns to scale and different market shares) 
regulators should be careful to use ‘symmetric reciprocity in mark-ups’ 
setting equal termination price to cost margins, since setting termination fees 
equal to the lowest cost among the providers could lead to foreclosure of 
rivals. 
Competition is modelled in a modified Hotelling Main Street framework, 
with two horizontally differentiated networks and a continuum of consumers 
with ideal points uniformly distributed on a segment joining the two networks 
locations. The following extensive-form game is studied. First, the consumers 
choose which network they want to subscribe to. In a second stage, the 
networks set their prices, and finally the consumers choose their telephone 
consumption levels. In making their subscription decision, consumers 
correctly anticipate the prices that the two networks are going to set in 
equilibrium in the second stage. This game structure is chosen for the 
following reasons. First, the model intends to capture situations where 
consumers are slower in changing network affiliation than in varying the 
amount of phone calls they make as firms change prices: one can think of the 
second stage of the game as the ‘short run’, and of the first stage as the ‘long 
run’. Telecommunications providers have observed that consumers are slow 
to change network affiliation.6 Second, the more traditional game in which 
consumers make their subscription decision after the networks have chosen 
their prices does not have equilibria in pure strategies for a wide range of 
parameters values and model specifications when interconnection fees are 
chosen strategically.7 
The main results are as follows. When the networks have equal costs and 
equal numbers of subscribers and set their prices simultaneously, they charge 
equal interconnection fees to each other. Thus, symmetric reciprocity in 
interconnection pricing is a feature of the market equilibrium when networks 
are of equal size. Also modelled is a setup when one of the networks sets 
prices first. A dominant (incumbent) network facing an entrant has a natural 
first-mover’s advantage in the termination fee, since the entrant has to accept 
an interconnection agreement to start business. That this advantage allows the 
first-movers to charge higher prices for incoming calls to his network is 
shown. 
The strategic advantage of the first-mover is eliminated if firms are 
restricted to charge each other the same termination access fee, that is, if 
symmetric reciprocity is imposed. When symmetric reciprocity is not 
imposed, even under strategic symmetry and simultaneous moves, pricing 
exhibits ‘double marginalisation’, that is, calls across networks are overpriced 
because each network fails to take into account the effects of its price 
changes on the opponent’s profit.8 However, the imposition of symmetric 
reciprocity fully internalises the vertical externality, thus eliminating the 
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double marginalisation and resulting in termination prices at cost, as well as 
in lower end-to-end prices. Thus, the application of the rule of symmetric 
reciprocity can improve social welfare. 
In the long run, each consumer subscribes to (at most) one network. When 
symmetric reciprocity is not imposed, multiple subscription equilibria may 
exist, including corner equilibria where one of the networks has zero size and 
the other network is a monopoly. A first-mover advantage in setting 
termination fees typically results in a larger size for the first-moving network, 
although corner equilibria may arise once again. However, the imposition of 
symmetric reciprocity in termination pricing eliminates the possibility of 
corner equilibria. Thus, the imposition of the conduct rule of symmetric 
reciprocity has significant structural effects. The eliminated corner equilibria 
have higher ‘transportation costs’, (that is, subscribers’ disutility) hence 
lower consumer surplus. Therefore, the structural and behavioural effects of 
imposing a symmetric reciprocity rule on interconnection fees are highly 
beneficial. 
An early version of this chapter circulated before most of the literature on 
two-sided bottlenecks in telecommunications. Laffont et al. (1998) analyse a 
similar structure. They limit the analysis to the case in which the 
interconnection fees are set exogenously and equal to each other, at a 
relatively low level. Hence, their analysis cannot capture the strategic 
implications of a network’s ability to control the termination fee that a rival 
network would have to pay; one of the main goals in this paper. Instead, 
Laffont et al. focus on the possibility that the two networks may collude in 
achieving higher output prices through collusion in access fees that are 
essentially inputs that each network supplies to the other.  
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. The next section sets up the 
network structure, derives the demand and profit functions, and discusses the 
various game structures considered. Following that the subsequent section 
characterises all equilibria of the various game structures and compares them. 
The final sections present welfare results and contain extensions and 
generalisations.  
 
 
THE MODEL 
 
Network Structures 
 
Suppose that two firms (networks), 1, 2i = , offer local access for telephone 
services in the same area to the same continuum of consumers. Assume that 
each consumer can subscribe to at most one network. The two networks are 
interconnected, so that a customer of Network i  can call any customer of 
Network j , as well as any customer of Network i . 
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Figure 5.1 Network structure 
 
Each phone call can be thought of as consisting of an originating part iA  and 
a terminating part jB , where i  and j  refer to the identities of the networks 
of origination and termination. Each Network i  sets three prices: a price is  
for ‘internal’ calls, that is, calls that originate and terminate in the network; 
an origination fee ip  for ‘outgoing’ calls, that is, calls that originate in 
Network i and terminate in the other network; and a termination fee iq  for 
‘incoming’ calls, that is, calls that originate in the other network and 
terminate in Network .i  
 
Table 5.1 Call types and prices 
 
Call type Price charged by 
1N  
Price charged by 
2N  
Total price 
    
Within 1N : 1 1to A B  1s  0  1s  
From 1N  to 2N : 1 2to A B  1p  2q  1 2p q+  
Within 2N : 2 2to A B  0  2s  2s  
From 2N  to 1N : 2 1to A B  1q  2p  2 1p q+  
 
The four possible types of calls, with the corresponding prices are as shown 
above in Table 5.1.9 
 
1s  2s  
1B  
1  A  2A  
2B  
2q  
2p  1p  
1N  2N  
1q  
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Demand and Profit Functions 
 
Consumers perceive the two networks as horizontally (variety) differentiated; 
they are distributed uniformly according to their ideal network on the interval 
[0,1] . The consumer who has the highest preference for Network 1 
(respectively 2) is ‘located’ at point 0 (respectively 1).10 Thus, a consumer of 
type [0,1]z∈  who subscribes to network i  derives total utility ( )zV i , where: 
 
1(1)zV U zλ= − ,  
 
2(2) (1 )zV U zλ= − −   
 
and iU  is her consumer surplus from buying telephone services from 
network i . The parameter (0, )λ ∈ ∞  measures the strength of preference for 
variety, that is, the degree of perceived horizontal differentiation. 
A consumer potentially makes calls to all other consumers. Denote by 
( )x θ  the quantity of phone calls that she makes to consumer θ , where 
[0,1]θ ∈ . Assume that all consumers have the same preferences over 
telephone calls (calling profiles/patterns) { }( ); [0,1]x θ θ ∈  and the outside 
good (‘money’) m . 
Two cases are analysed. First, consider general separable preferences 
represented by the functional:11 
 
 1
 0
( , ) ( )sU x m u x d mθ θ= +∫ ,  
 
where : [0, ) [0, )u ∞ → ∞ , with 
 
( )0 0, ' 0, '' 0u u u= > >   
 
and 
 
 2 ''( ) '''( ) 0u y yu i+ ≤ 12.  
 
Second, to capture substitutability between calls to any two different 
subscribers, consider the case of quadratic preferences:13 
 
 1  1  12
 0  0  0
( , )
2 2
b cU x m ax x d x x d d mτ τ τ θτ τ θ
 = − − + 
 ∫ ∫ ∫ ,  
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for 0 /x a bθ≤ ≤ , where a , b  and c  are positive real numbers, such that 
[0, )c b∈ . The degree of substitutability between calls to any two different 
subscribers increases with c . At 0c =  all phone calls are independent goods, 
and this becomes a special representation of the general separable case.14  
Let consumers in subset [ ]0,1iN ⊂  of measure in  subscribe to network 
1,2i = . The budget constraint of subscriber θ of Network 1 is: 
 
  1 21 1 2
( ) ( ) ( )
N N
s x d p q x d m Mθτ τ τ τ+ + + =∫ ∫ ,  
 
where Mθ  is her total wealth. 
With separable preferences, maximising U  subject to the budget 
constraint yields the same demand function x , equal to the inverse of 'u , for 
both types of calls, independent of the network sizes in  and jn . Denoting 
{ }( ) max ( )xv s u x sx≡ − , the consumer’s surplus function is: 
 
( , , , ) ( ) ( )s i i j i j i i j i jU s p q n n n v s n v p q+ = + + .  
 
For the quadratic case, maximising U  subject to the budget constraint yields 
both her demand function for internal calls iix  (that is, to any other customer 
of the same network) and her demand function for outgoing calls ijx  (that is, 
to each customer of the other network): 
 
1( , ; , ) ( )ii i i j i j i j i j i
cx s p q n n a s n p q s
bγ
 + = − + + − 
 
,  
 
1( , ; , ) ( )ij i j i i j i j i i i j
cx p q s n n a p q n s p q
bγ
 + = − − + − − 
 
,  
 
where 1 2( )b c n nγ ≡ + + . Substituting these demands into the utility function 
yields the consumer surplus for each subscriber of Network i : 
 
2 22 ( ) ( )( )
( , , , ) .
2 2 2
i j i j ii
i i j i j i j i j
a p q p q sa s
U s p q n n n n cn n
bγ γ γ
− − + −−
+ = + +  
 
Therefore, for both specifications of preferences, the model exhibits network 
externalities: given prices [0, )is a∈  and ip and jq such that [0, )i jp q a+ ∈ , 
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the welfare of each consumer is increasing in both in  and jn , that is, the 
consumer derives positive externalities from expansion of each of the two 
networks. If the calls are independent goods, U  and sU are linear in in  and 
jn : each new subscriber increases the consumer’s surplus by the same 
amount. Under non-separable preferences, U  is strictly concave, since the 
addition of a new subscriber reduces the value of calling the other 
subscribers. 
In the main part of the chapter, it is assumed that the fixed costs are zero 
and normalise the marginal cost to zero. This assumption is relaxed in the 
‘Extensions’ section where the two networks are allowed to have different 
marginal costs.15 Under non-separable preferences, Firm i ’s profit function 
is:16 
 
2( , , , , ) ( , ; , )
                               ( , ; , )
                               ( , ; , )
i i i j i j i i ii i i j i j
i i j ij i j i i j
i i j ji j i j i j
s p q n n s n x s p q n n
p n n x p q s n n
q n n x p q s n n
Π = +
+ +
+ +
  
 
and, with separable preferences, the Firm i ’s  profit is: 
 
2( , , , , ) ( ) ( )
                               ( ).
i i i j i j i i i i i j i j
i i j j i
s p q n n s n x s p n n x p q
q n n x p q
Π = + +
+ +
  
 
In both cases, the three terms represent, respectively, the revenue from 
internal, outgoing, and incoming calls. 
 
Game Structures 
 
The interaction among the networks and the consumers is modelled as a two-
stage game. In the first stage, all consumers simultaneously make their 
subscription decisions. In the second stage, the networks set their prices, and 
the consumers choose their consumption levels. Thus, the consumers cannot 
change their subscription decision after observing the networks’ prices. This 
does not mean that, when making the subscription decision, the consumers 
are uncertain about the prices set by the networks in the second stage: in 
equilibrium, they anticipate correctly all other parties’ actions. 
Three alternative structures are analysed for the second stage. First, in the 
benchmark structure, there is strategic symmetry, that is, the firms set all six 
prices simultaneously. Second, a game is analysed where one firm (Firm 1) 
sets its interconnection fee 1q  in advance. This structure captures situations 
where a dominant network is able to set its interconnection charge before the 
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other network has a chance to play. This happens, for example, when there is 
a single incumbent, and an entrant needs an interconnection agreement 
(specifying the termination fee) before starting business. Finally, in the third 
game, Firm 1 chooses the interconnection fee under the constraint of 
symmetric reciprocity in termination fees, that is, 1 2q q= . 
Both the case where the interconnection fee is set before the other prices, 
and the case where all six prices are set simultaneously are analysed. 
Symmetric reciprocity is imposed by law in many but not all jurisdictions. 
For example, in the United States reciprocal compensation of call termination 
is mandated by the Telecommunications Act of 1996, section 251(b)(5). On 
the other hand, the law is silent on symmetric reciprocity in New Zealand, 
and the issue of reciprocal termination pricing is central in the negotiations 
between telecommunications service providers. 
 
 
ANALYSIS 
 
Game 1: Strategic Symmetry 
 
Equilibrium prices 
To find the sub-game perfect equilibria, start by solving by backward 
induction. In the second stage, the networks set their prices simultaneously, 
given their sizes 1n  and 2n . The next proposition characterises the 
equilibrium prices. 
 
Proposition 1: With general separable preferences, for 1 20,  0n n> > , the 
equilibrium prices are: 
 
(1) (1) (1),   / 2m oi i is s p q t= = = ,  
 
with 1, 2,i =  where 
  
( ) '( ) 0m m mx s s x s+ ≡   
 
and 
 
( ) '( ) 0
2
o
o otx t x t+ ≡ .  
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Moreover, m os t< . If 0jn = , then 
(1) m
is s+  and all other prices can take 
arbitrary values. For proof see Appendix. 
With non-separable quadratic preferences, for 1 20,  0n n> > , the 
equilibrium prices are: 
 
(1) / 2is a= ,  
 
( ) ( )( )
(1) 2 3
6
i
i i
i
a b cn
p n
b cn
+
=
+
,  
 
( ) ( )
(1)
3j i i
abq n
b cn
=
+
,  
 
with 1,2i = . If 0jn = , then 
(1) / 2is a=  and all other prices can take 
arbitrary values. 
A number of observations are in order. First, under both preference 
specifications, and for any network size (1) (1) (1)(0,1),  i i i jn s p q∈ < + ; that is, 
outgoing calls are sold at a higher price than internal calls.17 This result is due 
to the fact that, while each Network i  supplies both components of its 
internal calls (the originating part iA  and the terminating part iB ), the two 
components of any outgoing call are sold by different networks. In the price 
setting process for outgoing calls, each firm fails to internalise the full benefit 
of a reduction in the price of its components. Thus, the perceived elasticity of 
demand is lower, and hence the equilibrium total price i jp q+  is higher, than 
the joint monopoly profit-maximising price.18 
Second, in general, parity fails to occur. Parity for interconnection holds 
when a network has to charge its customers the same amount it charges 
others for interconnection. Here parity fails since the larger network charges 
more for its origination and termination services when they are sold as part of 
hybrid calls than when they are used by itself, that is, if i jn n> , then 
i i is p q< + . 
Moreover, under non-separable preferences, the following additional results 
arise. First, the origination fee of an outgoing phone call is always larger than 
the termination fee of the same call, (1) (1)i jp q> . This is because the 
originating network has a strategic incentive to keep the price of outgoing 
calls high, since they are substitutes with its internal calls. On the other hand, 
the terminating network has no strategic incentive to keep termination prices 
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high, since the incoming call is not a substitute for its internal calls or for 
outgoing calls that originate from it. 
Second, the equilibrium origination fee (1)ip and termination fee 
(1)
jq  for 
outgoing calls are, respectively, increasing and decreasing functions of the 
originating ( )i  network’s size, (1) (1)/ 0,  / 0i i j idp dn dq dn> < , while the price 
of outgoing calls decreases in the size of the originating network, 
(1) (1)( ) / 0i j id p q dn+ < . These are all consequences of the relative strategic 
strengths of the two networks. As the size of Network i  increases, its 
stronger strategic power is reflected in a higher origination fee; this prompts a 
sharply lower termination fee by the opponent network, so that a hybrid call 
has a lower price despite the increase in its origination fee. 
Third, as a consequence of the inequalities stated above, if Network i  is 
larger than Network j , i jn n> , its outgoing calls are offered at a lower 
price, i j j ip q p q+ < + , but its origination and termination fees are higher, 
,  i j i jp p q q> > . Therefore, if network sizes differ, i jn n≠ , symmetric 
reciprocity fails. 
 
The subscription decision 
Now turn to the analysis of the consumers’ subscription decisions. In 
equilibrium, each consumer makes her choice, correctly anticipating the 
simultaneous choices of all other consumers as well as the prices that the 
firms will set in the second stage, as given in Proposition 1. When the 
consumers in subset iN  of measure in  subscribe to network i , 1, 2i = , the 
overall realised indirect utility of the consumer located at point θ , is 
( )1
1 2( , )V n n λθ− , if she subscribes to Network 1, and 
( ) ( ) ( )1 2 1, 1V n n λ θ− −  
if she subscribes to Network 2, where:19 
 
( )(1) (1) (1) (1), ) , ( ) ( ), ,i j i i i j i i jV n n U s p n q n n n( ≡ +   
 
and similarly for the separable case. Thus, in the non-separable case, 
 
( )2 2(1) 4 9 9 9( , )
72 ( )
j i i j i
i j
i
a bn bn cn n cn
V n n
b cnγ
+ + +
=
+
  
 
and, in the separable case: 
 
(1) ( , ) ( ) ( )m os i j i jV n n n v s n v t= + .  
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For both preference specifications, the consumer welfare increases in the size 
of each network, that is, all derivatives: 
 
(1) (1)
(1) (1)
( , ),             ( , ),   
( , )   and    ( , ),
i j s i j
i i
i j s i j
j j
V n n V n nn n
V n n V n nn n
∂ ∂
∂ ∂
∂ ∂
∂ ∂
 
 
are positive. Thus, the market mediated indirect utility function exhibits 
network externalities. 
The next proposition characterises all equilibria of Game 1. An 
equilibrium is indicated as a pair { }1 2,n n of network sizes. 
 
Proposition 2: For all parameter values and both consumer preference 
specifications, { }0,0  is an equilibrium. In addition, with non-separable 
quadratic preferences, the equilibrium correspondence is determined by five 
numbers (1) (1)51 ...λ λ< <  (defined in the Appendix) as follows: 
 
• { } { } { }{ } (1)1½,½ , 0,1 , 1,0 , for 0 <λ λ≤ ; 
 
• { } { } { } { } { }{ }½ ,½ , 0,1 , 1,0 , ½ ( ),½ ( ) , ½ ( ),½ ( )δ λ δ λ δ λ δ λ− + + − , 
 
where 
 
2 2
(1) (1)
1 22
( 2 ) 5
( ) ,    
4 72
c b ab for
bc
δ λ λ λ λ
λ
 +
≡ − < <  
 
; 
  
• { } { } { }{ } (1) (1)2 3½,½ , 0,1 , 1,0 , for λ λ λ≤ ≤ ; 
 
• { }{ } (1) (1)3 4½,½ ,for λ λ λ≤ ≤ ; 
 
• ( ) ( ){ }{ }(1) (1),n nλ λ∗ ∗ ; 
 
where 
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( ) ( )(1) 2 4 2 2 21 3 36 9 8 14448n a b a a b bcλ λ λ λλ∗
 ≡ − + − + 
 
, 
 
(1) (1)for < <  λ λ λ54 . 
 
With separable preferences, the equilibrium correspondence consists of: 
 
• { } { } { }{ }½,½ , 0,1 , 1,0 , for 0 < ( ) ( )mv s v tολ < − ; 
 
• { }{ },1 ;0 1 ,  for ( ) ( )mn n n v s v tολ− ≤ ≤ = − ; 
 
• { } { } { }{ }½,½ , 0,1 , 1,0 ,  for ( ) ( ) ( )m mv s v t v sο λ− < < ; 
 
• { }{ }½,½ ,  for ( ) ( ) ( )m mv s v s v tολ< < + ; and 
 
• { }{ }, ;0 ½ ,for ( ) ( )mn n n v s v tολ≤ ≤ = + . 
 
For proof see Appendix. 
Proposition 2 establishes that, except when λ  is large (1)5( )λ λ> , Game 1 
has multiple equilibria. However, imposing the requirement that the 
equilibria satisfy a notion of stability (see below) restricts the equilibrium set 
as follows: in the separable case, only one equilibrium is stable for almost all 
parameter values; under non-separable preferences, there is a unique stable 
equilibrium except for (1) (1)1 2[ , ]λ λ λ∈ , where both the corner equilibria and 
the symmetric equilibrium are stable. 
To define the stability notion, suppose that each consumer assigns a 
positive probability to the event that a (small, but of positive) fraction of 
consumers do not make their equilibrium subscription decision and that, if 
the corner outcome 1 1i jn n= − =  occurs, the firm will set prices 
(2 )(1) ,  (1)6 () 3( )i j
a b c abp qb c b c
+= =+ + , and 0 (0) / 3j ip q a= = = . That is, the 
equilibrium is ‘unstable’ if, in this case, some consumers have an incentive to 
revise their choice. This notion of stability is in the same spirit as Selten’s 
notion of trembling hand perfection in finite games. Selten’s notion cannot be 
applied directly, since it was defined only for finite games. 
According to this notion, { }0,0  is unstable whenever another equilibrium 
exists. Also, under separable preferences, { }½,½  is unstable for 
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( ) ( )m ov s v tλ < − ; and the corner equilibria are unstable for 
( ) ( ) ( )m o mv s v t v sλ− < < . Thus, neglecting the knife edge cases where 
{ }( ) ( ),  ( ) ( )m o m ov s v t v s v tλ ∈ − + , the only ‘stable’ equilibria are the corner 
ones for ( ) ( )m ov s v tλ < −  and the symmetric one for ( ) ( )m ov s v t λ− < . 
Under non-separable preferences, the stability notion eliminates the 
symmetric equilibrium for (1)1λ λ< , the two interior asymmetric equilibria 
whenever they exist (that is, for (1) (1)1 2λ λ λ< < ), and the corner equilibria for 
(1) (1)
2 3λ λ λ< < . 
To interpret the structure of the equilibrium correspondence, note the 
forces that determine them. First, consumers want to belong to a large 
network because prices of internal calls are lower than prices of calls across 
networks. Second, the benefit to a consumer of joining a network is 
diminished by the loss of utility which this consumer incurs because the 
prospective network does not coincide with her ‘most preferred’ network 
specification. This ‘horizontal differentiation’ cost is measured by λ . Each 
network’s size is determined by its marginal consumer who, in equilibrium, 
must weakly prefer joining her chosen network to both joining the other 
network and not joining any network. Thus, different values of λ  imply 
different equilibria. If the preferences for variety are not strong, that is, 
(1)
1(0, )λ λ∈ , the incentive to congregate at a single network dominates. 
Hence, the corner equilibria exist and the symmetric equilibrium is unstable. 
As λ  increases and enters the interval (1) (1)1 2( , )λ λ , the symmetric equilibrium 
becomes stable. In the interval (1) (1)2 4( , )λ λ  there are no stable corner 
equilibria, and the unique stable equilibrium is the symmetric one. For 
(1) (1)
54( , )λ λ λ∈ , there is a unique, symmetric equilibrium with partial 
coverage. Full coverage equilibria disappear since, for the consumer located 
at ½ , the horizontal differentiation cost now outweighs the net benefit from 
joining any network. As λ  increases further, the size of each network shrinks 
to zero. Finally, for { }(1)5 , 0,0λ λ≥  remains the only equilibrium. 
 
Game 2: Commitment by One Network on the Termination Fee 
 
Equilibrium prices 
In this game, given the network sizes from Stage 1, pricing takes place 
sequentially. First, Firm 1 sets its termination fee 1q . Then both firms set all 
other prices simultaneously. For simplicity, the analysis is restricted to the 
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case of quadratic preferences, including the (separable) case where 0c = . In 
the short run, Firm 1 chooses the interconnection fee before its opponent. 
 
Proposition 3: In Game 2, with quadratic preferences, the equilibrium prices 
(2) (2) (2) (2)
1 2 1 2, ,  and s s p q  are equal to the corresponding ones in Game 1. 
Moreover, 
 
(2) (1)2
2 2
2
2
4( 2 )
b cnp a p
b cn
+
= <
+
  
 
and  
 
(2) (1)
1 1
22( )
abq q
b cn
= >
+
.  
 
Further, 
 
(2) (2) (1) (1)
2 1 2 1p q p q+ > +   
 
and 
 
(2) (2) (2) (2)
1 2 1 2,p p q q> > .  
 
A number of observations are in order. First, the strategic advantage of being 
able to commit on the interconnection fee allows Firm 1 to charge higher 
origination and termination fees than its rival, (2) (2) (2) (2)1 2 1 2,  p p q q> > , for 
any network sizes in the separable case as well as when the two networks are 
of equal sizes in the non-separable case. Thus, symmetric reciprocity fails. 
Under the same conditions, outgoing calls from Network 1 are cheaper than 
outgoing calls from Network 2, (2) (2) (2) (2)2 1 1 2 p q p q+ > + . These conclusions 
derive from the strategic advantage of the leader. 
Parity also fails in general. The leader always prices its origination and 
termination components higher to others than to itself, that is,  
(2) (2) (2)
1 1 1s p q< + . On the other hand, the follower may price its components 
lower to others than to itself. 
A number of the qualitative results of the simultaneous game are 
preserved. First, internal calls are cheaper than outgoing calls. Second, 
origination fees are increasing in the size of the originating network, and, 
third, termination fees and total fees for outgoing calls are decreasing in the 
size of the originating network. Fourth, the customers of Network 1 face the 
16 The economics of digital markets 
same prices as in Game 1: hence their welfare remains unchanged. Fifth, the 
customers of Network 2 face a higher price for their outgoing calls (but the 
same price for the internal calls), and so their surplus is lower than in Game 
1. It follows that total consumer surplus is lower in Game 2. 
 
The subscription decision 
In the first stage, the consumers make their subscription decisions. The next 
proposition characterises all equilibria { }1 2,n n  for the separable utility case. 
 
Proposition 4: The equilibrium correspondence is as follows: 
 
• { } { } { }{ }(2) (1)1,0 , ( ),1 ( ) , 0,1n nλ λ∗ ∗− , 
 
where 
 
2
(2)
2
5 72
( ) 4
47 576
a bn
a b
λ
λ
λ∗
−
≡
−
, 
 
25
for 0
72
a
b
λ< ≤  
 
• { }{ }
2 25 3
1,0 ,
72 32
a a
b b
λ< < , 
 
• ( ) ( ){ }{ }
2 2
(2) (2) 3,1  for 
32 6
a an n
b b
λ λ λ∗ ∗− < < . 
 
For proof see Appendix. 
Notice that symmetric equilibria, 1 2 ½n n= = , never exist. Unique 
asymmetric interior equilibria with full coverage exist in two separate regions 
of λ . When λ  is large, the full coverage equilibrium is stable and Network 
1 is larger, benefiting from its first-mover advantage. When λ  is small, the 
full coverage equilibrium is unstable and Network 2 is larger. It is not likely 
that such equilibria will be observed. 
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Game 3: Commitment in the Termination Fee with Symmetric 
Reciprocity 
 
Next consider the case when Network 1 chooses the interconnection fee 
subject to symmetric reciprocity: 1 2q q q= = . Thus, Firm 1 is unable to 
create a difference in interconnection fees to its advantage, although it has 
control over its rival’s termination fee. Two game structures are analysed. In 
the first (Game 3.1), Network 1 sets 1 2 1,  ,q q q s= =  and 1p  and, 
simultaneously, Firm 2 chooses 2s  and 2p . The second game structure 
(Game 3.2) has one additional stage. Network 1 chooses q  in advance; 
subsequently Network 1 chooses 1s  and 1p , and Network 2 chooses 2s  and 
2p  simultaneously. 
 
Proposition 5: In both Game 3.1 and Game 3.2, the equilibrium prices are as 
follows: in the non-separable case: 
 
0,   / 2i iq s p a= = = ,  
 
with 1, 2i =  and, in the separable case: 
 
0,   mi iq s p t= = = ,  
 
with 1, 2i = , where ( ) '( ) 0m m mx t t x t+ ≡ . 
Proposition 5 shows that under symmetric reciprocity on the termination 
fees, Network 1 sets the interconnection fee equal to its marginal cost (zero) 
and both networks set the other two prices at the monopoly level. This 
happens independently of whether Firm 1 sets the interconnection fee in 
advance or simultaneously with all the other prices. Thus, imposing 
symmetric reciprocity eliminates the ‘double marginalisation’ effect: the 
firms charge their monopoly prices on both internal and outgoing calls. In 
comparison to Game 1, the welfare of all consumers, as well as both firms’ 
profits is higher. Note also that symmetric reciprocity implies exact parity, 
that is, at equilibrium, i i is p q= + . 
The intuition behind the results is as follows. The symmetric reciprocity 
constraint enables Network 1 to control the total price 1p q+  of its outgoing 
calls. Thus, Network 1 is able to fully reap the benefits of price decreases of 
components of 1 2A B , thereby eliminating the double marginalisation effect. 
Network 1’s pricing of components 1A  and 1B  become equivalent to pricing 
of components 1A  and 2B . Thus, Network 1 acts as a monopolist who 
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perfectly controls the price of both its internal and its outgoing calls. Looking 
at the separable case for simplicity, Network 1’s problem for outgoing calls 
is: 
 
max ( ( ) ) ( ( ) )o o
q
p q q x p q q+ + ,  
 
where ( ) argmax ( )o pp q px p q= + . The optimal price for outgoing calls is 
then the monopoly price mt , which can be written as ( )m ot p q q∗ ∗= + . This 
monopoly price can only be achieved (in both the simultaneous and 
sequential structures) by setting 0q q∗= = , since (0)o mp t=  and ( )op q  are 
strictly increasing. In other words, first, symmetric reciprocity allows 
Network 1 to achieve the monopoly pricing for outgoing calls; second, 
monopoly pricing can only occur when the first mark-up is zero. Thus, 
Network 1 sets the termination fee at marginal cost, that is, zero. 
 
The subscription decision 
Turning to the consumers’ subscription decision, each consumer earns the 
same surplus independent of her network affiliation, since internal calls cost 
as much as outgoing calls. In the non-separable case: 
 
( )
2
(3) ( )( , )
8 ( )
i j
i j
i j
a n n
V n n
b c n n
+
=
+ +
  
 
and in the separable case: 
 
(3) ( , ) ( ) ( )mi j i jV n n n n v t= + .  
 
Proposition 6: In the non-separable quadratic case, in addition to { }0,0 , the 
equilibria are: 
 
• { }{ }
2
½,½ ,  for 0
4( )
a
b c
λ< ≤
+
; 
 
• { }(3) (3)( ), ( )n nλ λ∗ ∗ , 
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2 2
for 
4( ) 4
a a
b c b
λ< ≤
+
, 
 
where 
 
2
(3) 4( )
8
a bn
c
λ
λ
λ∗
−
≡ . 
 
In the separable case, in addition to { }0,0 , there is only one additional 
equilibrium, { }½,½ , for 0 2 ( )mv sλ< ≤ . For proof see Appendix. 
Thus, symmetric reciprocity eliminates the corner (monopoly) equilibria 
which may arise both in Game 1 and Game 2; the symmetric one is the only 
full-coverage equilibrium. In the price sub-game, symmetric reciprocity 
eliminates the power of the leader to set different prices for termination, and 
the leader finds it to its benefit to set termination charges to marginal cost, 
resulting in equal prices for outgoing and internal calls. This eliminates the 
possibility of a price squeeze which would generate the monopoly (corner) 
equilibria. Thus, symmetric reciprocity—a conduct rule—has a structural 
effect, the elimination of corner equilibria and the promotion of duopoly over 
monopoly. 
 
 
WELFARE ANALYSIS 
 
Table 5.2 summarises the welfare analysis for the quadratic case of Game 1 
and Game 3, which are both symmetric. Let CS denote the total consumer 
surplus, and Π denote the sum of the profits of the two networks. 
The rankings in the table hold for any value of λ  such that the equilibria 
exist. The profits’ ranking is a consequence of the ‘double marginalisation’ 
effect, which is present only in the symmetric equilibrium of Game 1. At the 
corner equilibria, only one firm is producing; hence there is no demand for 
outgoing calls; and in Game 3, the symmetric reciprocity constraint 
eliminates the double marginalisation problem by incorporating the 
termination fee in Firm 1’s decision problem. 
The elimination of double marginalisation also increases total consumer 
surplus, since it lowers the equilibrium prices to their monopoly level. This 
happens both at the corner equilibria of Game 1 and at the equilibrium of 
Game 3. The latter, however, is preferable from the consumers’ perspective, 
since their total ‘transportation costs’ are minimised at the symmetric 
outcome. 
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Table 5.2 Welfare analysis 
 
 Game 1  
(symmetric) 
 Game 2  
(corner) 
 Game 3  
(symmetric reciprocity) 
CS  
2 (13 9 )
72( )(2 ) 4
a b c
b c b c
λ+
−
+ +
 < 
2
8( ) 2
a
b c
λ
−
+
 < 
2
8( ) 4
a
b c
λ
−
+
 
Π  
2 (17 9 )
36( )(2 )
a b c
b c b c
+
+ +
  < 
2
4( )
a
b c+
 = 
2
4( )
a
b c+
 
 
 
EXTENSIONS 
 
Heterogeneous Preferences 
 
In this section, it is shown that the results obtained for the short run in the 
previous sections hold even if the consumers have heterogeneous preferences 
for telephone services, provided that these preferences are not correlated with 
their preferences over network variety. In other words, the critical condition 
is that each consumer’s position on the unit segment is independent of her 
preferences for telephone services. 
In the model of Section 2, each consumer has the same preferences over 
telephone consumption. One way in which this assumption can be 
generalised is to assume that the consumer located at [ ]0,1θ ∈  has utility 
function: 
 
 1  1  12
'
 0  0  0
( , ) ( )  ' ,
2 2
b cU x m ax x d x x d d mψ τ τ τ τψ θ τ τ τ
  = − − +    ∫ ∫ ∫
 
 
 
where ψ  is any integrable function defined on [0,1] . ( )ψ θ  measures the 
intensity of preference for telecommunications services for a consumer of 
type θ . The corresponding demand functions are: 
 
( ) ( )ii i j i j i
cx a s n p q s
b
ψ ψ θ
γ
 = − + + − 
 
  
and 
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( ) ( )ij i j i i i j
cx a p q n s p q
b
ψ ψ θ
γ
 = − − + − − 
 
.  
 
and the profit function is: 
 
1 ( )
1      ( )
1      ( )
i i i i i j i j i
i j i i j i i i j
i i i j i j j j i
cm n s a s n p q s
b
cm n p a p q n s p q
b
cm n q a p q n s p q
b
ψ
γ
γ
γ
 Π = − + + − 
 
 + − − + − − 
 
 + − − + − − 
 
,  
 
where 
 
( ) ( )
i
i i i i iN
m d n E N nψ θ θ ψ θ θ ψ ≡ ≡  ∈ ≡ ∫ . 
With these preferences, the short run equilibrium outcome in Game 1 
remains unchanged. In Game 3, it is still the case that (3) / 2is a=  and 
(3) ½( )ip a q= − , as in the case of identical preferences. Network 1 now 
chooses: 
 
(3) 2 1
2 2 1 1
( )
2 ( ) ( )
abq
b cn b cn
ψ ψ
ψ ψ
−
=
+ − +
.  
 
Thus (3) 0q =  if and only if 2 1ψ ψ= , which holds if the consumers’ intensity 
of preference for telephone calls (represented by the function ψ ) are not 
correlated with their preferences for variety (represented by their position 
θ on the unit segment). 
 
Different Costs 
 
In the main part of the chapter it is assumed that the costs of the two 
networks were the same, and without further loss of generality assumed them 
to be zero. This assumption is reasonable if the two networks operate in the 
same area and face the same geographic conditions, and the technology of 
production is well known and exhibits constant returns to scale. However, 
symmetric reciprocity has also been proposed and practiced in international 
telephony, where the costs can easily differ across the two networks 
(countries), as well as in mobile networks where there are increasing returns 
to scale and, even with the same technology, firms can have quite different 
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termination costs if their scales of operation differ significantly. This section 
investigates the effects of symmetric reciprocity when marginal production 
costs differ across networks. It is shown that the regulatory imposition of a 
generalised symmetric reciprocity rule has the same effects as in the equal 
costs case. The generalised symmetric reciprocity rule takes the form of equal 
mark-ups above marginal costs, and called ‘symmetric reciprocity in mark-
ups’. Notice that, in the presence of different unit costs (as in the example 
above), imposing a rule that would set equal termination prices across 
networks would result in foreclosure of one or more higher cost networks, 
which is exactly what the regulation aims to avoid. Symmetric reciprocity in 
mark-ups should be imposed instead. 
For simplicity, only cases with linear demands and independent goods are 
shown; the proof for general demand is identical. Assume that Network i ’s 
marginal cost of providing either origination or termination services is im , 
1, 2i = . Then Firm i ’s  profit iΠ satisfies: 
 
2( 2 ) ( ) ( ) ( )
       ( ) ( ).
i i i i i i i i j i j
i i i j j i
b s m n a s p m n n a p q
q m n n a p q
Π = − − + − − −
+ − − −
  
 
First, as a benchmark, note that the prices that maximise the joint profits 
1 2Π +Π  are: 
 
2i i
as m= +   
 
and  
 
1 2½( )i jp q a m m+ = + + .  
 
Solving for the Nash equilibrium of the strategic symmetry price sub-game 
(Game 1), yields: 
 
2i i
as m= + ,  
 
( 2 )i j j ip q a m m= = + +⅓   
 
and 
 
1 2 (2 )i jp q a m m+ = + +⅓ .  
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Thus, in Game 1, at the Nash equilibrium,  i jp q+  is higher than the joint 
profit-maximising level. As before, this is due to the double marginalisation 
effect, that is, to the failure of each network to internalise the full effect of 
changing its prices. 
The generalised symmetric reciprocity rule is applied to mark-ups; that is, 
it is imposed that the mark-up above cost of Network 1 is equal to the mark-
up above cost of Network 2: 
 
2 2 1 1q m q m− = − .  
 
Maximising 1Π , subject to this constraint, with respect to 1 1 1,   and s p q , 
maximising 2Π  with respect to 2 2and s p , and solving for the equilibrium 
yields: 
 
2i i
as m= + ,  
 
½( )j i jp a m m= − + ,  
 
and i iq m= , for 1, 2i = . Therefore, the imposition of symmetric reciprocity 
on mark-ups results in pricing of termination at cost. It follows that outgoing 
calls are priced at: 
 
1 2½( )i jp q a m m+ = + +   
 
and consequently, all prices are at their collusive levels. This is because 
imposing ‘symmetric reciprocity in mark-ups’ on the termination fees 
eliminates the double marginalisation.20  
 
Low Switching Costs 
 
Up to this point, it has been assumed that the two networks set their prices 
only after the consumers make irreversible subscription decisions. This 
feature of the model aims to capture the idea that changing network 
affiliation is costly in a particular way: it is only feasible in the ‘long run’. 
The basic model is close to reality, as telecommunications providers have 
observed that consumers tend to be slow in revising their subscription 
decisions. However, to test robustness of the results to alternative 
specifications this subsection allows for simultaneous subscription and 
quantity decisions by the consumers, which follow the announcement of 
prices. 
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The analysis with low switching costs is complicated by the presence of 
network externalities. After firms have chosen prices, consumers will choose 
different quantities of output, and possibly different network affiliation as 
well, depending on what each consumer believes the other consumers will do. 
Thus, the demand function faced by a network, as well as its size, depends on 
coordination among the consumers in the sub-game. This makes each firm’s 
maximisation problem dependent on its conjectures about the consumers’ 
choices in the sub-game starting after the firms set their prices. Moreover, 
when setting prices, it is natural to expect that a network will take actions to 
tilt the coordination of the consumers in its favour. Thus, the problem with 
low switching costs is considerably more complex than the one of high 
switching costs. The next Proposition, however, establishes the existence of 
corner equilibria when consumers have a weak preference for variety. 
 
Proposition 7: Consider the following multi-stage games: 
Game 1': in Stage 1, the networks set their three respective prices 
simultaneously; in Stage 2 the consumers make their subscription and 
consumption decisions. 
Game 2': in Stage 1, Network 1 chooses iq ; in Stage 2, the two networks 
set all other prices simultaneously; in Stage 3, the consumers make their 
subscription and consumption decisions. 
Game 3.1': in Stage 1, Network 1 chooses 1 2q q= ; in Stage 2, Network 2 
sets 2s , and 2p , and, simultaneously, Network 1 sets 1s  and 1p ; in Stage 3, 
the consumers make their subscription and consumption decisions. 
Game 3.2': in Stage 1, Network 2 sets 2s , and 2p , and, simultaneously, 
Network 1 sets 1 1 1, ,s p q  and 2q , subject to 1 2q q= ; in Stage 2, the 
consumers make their subscription and consumption decisions. 
In all four games above, with quadratic preferences, corner equilibria exist, 
where 1 0i jn n= − = , / 2is a= , 0ip =  and iq a> , for all 
2
8( )
a
b c
λ ≤
+
. 
Proof: in each of these games, given prices / 2is a= , 0ip =  and iq a> , 
suppose that all consumers, except the one located at point θ , subscribe to 
network i .Then this consumer realises utility: 
 
2 2( )
2 () 8( )
ia s a
b c b c
λθ λθ
−
− = −
+ +
,  
if she subscribes to network i . Since iq a> , she would make no outgoing 
calls and therefore realise non-positive utility if she subscribed to Network 
 Strategic commitments and the principle of reciprocity 25 
j . Therefore, for 
2
8( )
a
b c
λ≥
+
, the consumer at θ  joins Network i  for 
every [0,1]θ ∈ . Under this condition, Network j  makes zero profit for any 
2 2 2( , , )s p q , and Network i  maximises its profit by setting / 2is a= . This 
establishes 1,  0i jn n= =  as an equilibrium.  
The intuition of the proof is as follows. When the quantity and 
subscription choices are simultaneous, a ‘large’ network can set a high 
termination fee to reduce the number of phone calls that reach it (originating 
from the other network). Then a customer of the other network is essentially 
restricted to calls within her (small) network and will realise low utility. 
Thus, such actions of a large network will result in more consumers leaving 
the smaller network and joining the larger one. The small network is unable 
to effectively counter the high termination fee of the larger network, until, at 
equilibrium, the ‘small’ network has no subscribers. Therefore, in this case, 
corner equilibria always exist.21 
Proposition 7 indicates that, when switching costs are low, symmetric 
reciprocity does not eliminate the corner equilibria if preference for variety is 
weak. This is in contrast with the results of Proposition 6. Therefore, 
imposing symmetric reciprocity may not be as effective if the consumers 
have low switching costs. 
 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
This study analysed equilibrium interconnection fees set by competing two-
way networks. The analysis finds that commitment in interconnection fees by 
a dominant network results in a price squeeze and possible foreclosure of the 
rival network. When the costs of the networks are equal, if the rule of 
symmetric reciprocity is imposed (that is, the networks are forced to charge 
each other equal amounts for call termination), the strategic advantage of the 
first-mover is eliminated, and prices of end-to-end services are lower. 
Furthermore, under symmetric reciprocity, each network sets its termination 
fee equal to zero (that is, marginal cost) and parity holds, so that each 
network charges itself as much as it charges others for the same service. 
Thus, the imposition of a regulatory rule of symmetric reciprocity induces the 
networks to choose a low (common) termination fee in equilibrium. 
Symmetric reciprocity internalises the vertical externality, eliminates the 
double marginalisation, and results in lower prices even in comparison to the 
simultaneous action pricing game. Under symmetric reciprocity, both 
consumers’ surplus and industry profits are higher than in the simultaneous 
pricing game. These results demonstrate the benefits of requiring symmetric 
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reciprocity in setting interconnection charges, and hence justify imposition of 
this rule when implementing the Telecommunications Act of 1996. 
The subscription decision stage typically has multiple equilibria, including 
corner ones, where all consumers subscribe to only one network. However, 
when symmetric reciprocity is imposed, the network with the strategic 
advantage chooses to set termination fees at cost. As a result, there are no 
corner equilibria. This is an added benefit of symmetric reciprocity, since a 
corner equilibrium would result in a significant ‘transportation cost’ welfare 
loss. When the costs of the networks differ, the appropriate regulatory rule is 
symmetric reciprocity of termination price mark-ups above cost. 
The main part of the analysis is done in game structures which try to 
capture the notion that consumers are slower in revising their subscription 
decisions than they are in adjusting their quantity in response to price 
changes. This assumption is currently seen by telecommunications providers 
as realistic. 
In the extensions section, the possibility of allowing subscribers to 
simultaneously choose network affiliation and consumption levels, after the 
networks have set their prices is considered. As pointed out there, in such a 
setup, there are consumers’ coordination problems that make it difficult to 
even write the maximisation problem of the firms without specific 
assumptions regarding the way they coordinate. In this setup, Proposition 7 
establishes the existence of corner equilibria when consumers have weak 
preference for network variety. This may suggest that, if consumers revise 
their subscription choices as easily as their consumption decisions, symmetric 
reciprocity as a regulatory rule may not be sufficient to eliminate 
monopolisation and foreclosure effects. However, the analysis considers that 
symmetric reciprocity is an effective regulatory rule on the assumption 
(supported by practitioners’ statements) that consumers tend to adjust their 
quantity decisions much more frequently than their subscription decisions. 
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APPENDIX  
 
Proof of Proposition 1 
 
In the separable case, the first order conditions are: 
 
                ( ) '( ) 0,
( ) '( ) 0,
( ) '( ) 0 .
i i i
i j i i j
j i i j i
x s s x s
x p q p x p q
x p q q x p q
+ =
+ + + =
+ + + =
  
 
The first equation implies 1 2
ms s s= = . Subtracting the third from the second 
equation yields: 
 
( ) '( ) 0,i i i jp q x p q− + =   
 
which implies / 2oi ip q t= = , where t  is defined as ( ) '( ) 02
o
o otx t x t+ ≡ . 
With non-separable preferences, maximising IIi  with respect to is , ip , 
and iq , given js , jp , and jq  yields the equilibrium prices. 
 
Proof of Proposition 2 
 
The five numbers indicated in the proposition are: 
 
2 2
(1) (1)
1 22
2 2
(1) (1)
3 4
2
(1)
5
5 5,        ,
72( )18( 2 )
(9 13 ),             ,
8( ) 36( )(2 )
13and                               .
72
a b a
b cc b
a a c b
b c b c b c
a
b
λ λ
λ λ
λ
≡ ≡
++
+
≡ ≡
+ + +
≡
  
 
With 0c = , the preferences are separable, and: 
 
2
(1) (1)
1 2
5 ( ) ( ),
72
m oa v s v t
b
λ λ= = = −   
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2
(1)
3 ( )8
ma v s
b
λ = =  
 
 
and  
 
2
(1) (1)
54
13 ( ) ( ).
72
m oa v s v t
b
λ λ= = = +   
 
First, {0,0}  is always an equilibrium: each consumer has no incentive to 
subscribe to any network if no other consumer subscribes. 
Second, the corners {0,1}  and {1,0}  are equilibrium outcomes if and only 
if: 
 
{ }(1) (1)(1,0) max 0, (0,1)V Vλ− ≥ .  
 
In the non-separable case, this is equivalent (for 1 1i jn n= − = ) to: 
 
22 ( )
max 0,
8( ) 2 ()
j ia p qa
b c b c
λ
 − − − ≥  
+ +  
.  
 
Since the equilibrium prices jp  and iq  are arbitrary, corner equilibria exist 
for any (1)3λ λ≤ . In the separable case, the inequality above becomes: 
 
{ }( ) max 0, ( )m j iv s v p qλ− ≥ + ,  
 
which is satisfied for arbitrary prices jp  and iq  if and only if ( )
mv sλ ≤ . 
 Any other pair 1 2{ , }n n , such that 1 2 1n n+ ≤ , is an equilibrium if and only 
if: 
 
{ }( , ) max 0, ( , ) (1 )i j i j i iV n n n V n n nλ λ− = − − , (5.1) 
 
with 1, 2i = . In words, the marginal consumer subscribing to Network 1 
(resp. 2), located at point 1n  (resp. 21 n− ), must earn the same payoff as his 
next best alternative. This condition is necessary because, if it does not hold, 
the consumers located in some neighbourhood of 1n , or 21 n− , have an 
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incentive to revise their subscription decision. The condition is also sufficient 
because it implies: 
 
{ }( , ) max 0, ( , ) (1 )i j j iV n n d V n n dλ λ− > − − ,  
 
for all [0, )id n∈ ; thus no infra marginal consumer of any network has any 
incentive to revise her subscription decision. 
In principle, Condition (5.1) can be satisfied in four cases, considering all 
possible combinations of equalities and inequalities. However, 
( , ) 0i j iV n n nλ− = implies: 
 
{ }
{ }
{ }
( , ) max 0, ( , ) (1 )
                        max 0, (1 )
                        max 0, ( 1)
                        0.
j i j i j j
i j
i j
V n n n V n n n
n n
n n
λ λ
λ λ
λ
− = − −
= − −
= + −
=
  
 
Thus only two cases are possible: that is, either: 
 
( , ) ( , ) (1 ) 0i j i j i iV n n n V n n nλ λ− = − − ≥  (5.2) 
 
or 
 
( , ) 0 ( , ) (1 )i j i j i iV n n n V n n nλ λ− = > − − , (5.3) 
 
with 1, 2i = . 
First, suppose that (5.2) holds. Then, summing the two equalities and 
simplifying yields 1 2 1n n+ = , that is, the two networks cover the whole 
market. Thus the equalities in (5.2) are equivalent to the single equation in 
τ : 
 
( ,1 ) (1 , ) (2 1)V Vτ τ τ τ λ τ− − − = − ,  
 
In the non-separable case, this equation has solutions 1 ½τ = , 2 ½ ( )τ δ λ= − , 
and 3 ½ ( )τ δ λ= + . The pair {½,½}  is an equilibrium if and only if: 
 
(½,½) ½ 0V λ− ≥  (5.4) 
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or, equivalently, 3λ λ≤ . 
Since δ  is increasing in λ , (1)1( ) 0δ λ =  and 
(1)
2( ) ½δ λ = , the pairs 
{ }½ ( ),1 ( )δ λ δ λ+ −  and { }½ ( ),1 ( )δ λ δ λ− +  can be equilibrium outcomes 
only if (1) (1)1 2λ λ λ≤ ≤ . This last condition is also sufficient, since it implies 
that the inequalities in (5.2) are satisfied. 
In the separable case, equation (5.4) becomes linear in τ . For 
( ) ( )m ov s v tλ ≠ − , the only solution is 1 ½τ = . Thus {½,½} is an equilibrium 
if and only if:  
 
(½,½) ½ 0V λ− ≥ ,  
 
that is, 0 ( ) ( )m ov s v tλ< ≤ + . 
For ( ) ( )m ov s v tλ = − , { ,1 }n n−  is an equilibrium for any [0,1]n∈ , since 
( )( ,1 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0m o oV n n v s v t n v t− − − = > .      
Now suppose that (5.3) holds. Then, all solutions different from {0,0}  
must have both 1n  and 2n  strictly positive, because, in the non-separable 
case, 0in =  and ( , ) 0i j iV n n nλ− =  imply: 
 
2 (4 )
0
72 ( )
j
j
a bn
b b cn
=
+
,  
 
that is, 0jn = ; and in the separable case, 0in =  and 
( ) ( ) 0m oi j in v s n v t nλ+ − =  imply 0jn = . 
In the separable case, subtracting one equality in (5.3) from the other 
yields: 
 
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )m oi j i jn n v s v t n nλ− − = − ,  
 
which implies i jn n=  unless ( ) ( )
m ov s v tλ = − . For ( ) ( )m ov s v tλ ≠ − , 
( )( ) ( ) 0m on v s v t λ+ − =  implies 0n = ; hence no other equilibrium exists. 
For ( ) ( )m ov s v tλ = − , the equality ( )( ) ( ) 0m on v s v t λ+ − =  holds for any n ; 
hence { , }n n is an equilibrium for any [0,½]n∈ . 
In the non-separable case, rewriting the equalities in (5.3) as: 
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2 2(4 9 9 9 ) 72( )( )j i i j i i i j ia bn bn cn n cn n b cn cn b cnλ+ + + = + + + ,  
 
dividing through by in , subtracting one from the other and rearranging 
yields: 
 
( )
2
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
1 2
4 ( )( ) 7 2 ( ) ( )a b n n n n c b c n n n n
n n
λ− + − = + + − ,  
 
which implies 1 2n n= : in fact, if 1 2 0n n− ≠ , then dividing by 1 2( )n n−  
yields: 
 
( )
2
1 2 1 2
1 2
4 ( ) 7 2 ( )a b n n c b c n n
n n
λ− + = + + ,  
 
a contradiction. 
Thus, the two equalities in (5.3) are equivalent to 0 ( , )V n n nλ= − , or:  
 
1 ( , )V n n
n
λ= , (5.5) 
 
If [0,½]n∈  satisfies (5.5) then { , }n n  is an equilibrium, since it also satisfies 
the inequalities in (5.3):  
 
( , ) (1 ) (1 ) 0V n n n n nλ λ λ− − = − − ≤ ,  
 
Since 1 ( , )V n n
n
 is decreasing in n  and 32 (½,½)V λ= , there is no 
equilibrium where (5.3) holds if (1)30 λ λ< < . For any λ  such that 
(1) (1)
3 4λ λ λ≤ < , there is a unique n  that satisfies (5.5), given by 
(1) ( )n λ∗ . 
 
Proof of Proposition 4 
 
Substituting the equilibrium prices into the consumers utility functions yields:  
 
2
1
(2) 1 2 2 1( , ) (4 9 )72
aV n n n n
b
= +   
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and  
 
2
2
(2) 2 1 1 2( , ) ( 4 )32
aV n n n n
b
= + ,  
 
Proceeding as in the proof of Proposition 2, {1,0}  is an equilibrium for 
25
72
a
b
λ ≤  and {0,1}  is an equilibrium for 
23
32
a
b
λ ≤ . 
For all other pairs 1 2{ , }n n , attention is restricted to the two cases:  
 
(2) (2)( , ) ( , ) (1 ) 0
i i
i j i j i iV n n n V n n nλ λ− = − − >   
 
and  
 
(2) (2)( , ) 0 ( , ) (1 )
i i
i j i j i iV n n n V n n nλ λ− = > − − ,  
 
with 1, 2i = . 
As in Game 1, the first case implies full coverage, 1 2 1n n+ = ; and the 
equality for the marginal consumer is:  
 
2 2 2 25 3 (1 ) (1 )
18 72 32 32
a a a an n n n
b b b b
λ λ+ − = + − − − ,  
 
with solution (2) ( )n n λ= . The pair { }(2) (2)( ),1 ( )n nλ λ−  is an equilibrium 
for 
25
72
a
b
λ ≤ , since this implies:  
 
( )(2) (2) (2)(2) ( ),1 ( ) ( ) 0iV n n nλ λ λ λ− − ≥ .  
 
In the other case, the system: 
 
2
1
(2) 1 2 2 1 1( , ) (4 9 ) 072
aV n n n n n
b
λ= + − = ,  
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2
2
(2) 2 1 1 2 2( , ) ( 4 ) 032
aV n n n n n
b
λ= + − = ,  
 
yields 1 2 0n n= = . 
 
Proof of Proposition 6 
 
Corner equilibria do not exist since 
2
(3) (1) 0
8( )
aV
b c
= >
+
 and, for any 0λ > ,  
 
{ }(3) (3)(1) max 0, (1)V Vλ− < . 
 
Any other point 1 2{ , }n n , with 1 2 1n n+ ≤ , is an equilibrium if and only if:  
 
{ }(3) (3)( , ) max 0, ( , ) (1 )i i j i j j i iV n n n V n n nλ λ− = − − , 
 
with 1, 2i = . As in the proof of proposition of Game 1, only two cases are 
possible. Case 1 implies full coverage; hence { ,1 }n n−  is an equilibrium only 
if: 
 
2 2
(1 )
8( ) 8( )
a an n
b c b c
λ λ− = − −
+ +
, 
 
which implies ½n = . If 
2
4( )
a
b c
λ ≤
+
, then (3) (½,½) ½ 0iV λ− ≥ . Thus 
{½,½}  is an equilibrium if and only if  
2
4( )
a
b c
λ ≤
+
. 
In Case 2, 
( )
2
(3) ( )( , ) 0
8 ( )
i j
i i j i i
i j
a n n
V n n n n
b c n n
λ λ
+
− = − =
+ +
 implies:  
 
( )2 ( ) 8 ( ) 0i j i i ja n n n b c n nλ+ − + + = , 
 
with 1, 2i = . Subtracting one equality from the other yields:  
 
( )1 2 1 28 ( ) ( ) 0b c n n n nλ + + − = , 
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which implies 1 2n n= ; otherwise, dividing by 1 2( )n n−  generates a 
contradiction. Thus the two equalities are equivalent to: 
 
2
(3) ( , ) 0
4( 2 )i
a nV n n n n
b cn
λ λ− = − =
+
, 
 
which implies 0n =  or (3)* ( )n n λ= . Since 
(3)
* ( )n n λ=  is decreasing in λ , 
2
(3)
* ½4( )
an
b c
 
=  + 
 and 
2
(3)
* 04
an
b
 
=  
 
, { }(3) (3)* *( ), ( )n nλ λ  is an equilibrium 
for 
2 2
,
4( ) 4
a a
b c b
λ
 
∈  
+ 
. 
In the separable case, Case 1 implies:  
 
( ) ( ) (1 )m mv t n v t nλ λ− = − − , 
 
that is, ½n = . Thus {½,½}  is an equilibrium for all λ  such that 
( ) ½ 0mv t λ− ≥ , that is, 2 ( )mv tλ ≤ . 
In Case 2, ( ) ( ) 0mi j in n v t nλ+ − = , for 1, 2i = , implies 2 0in n= = . 
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NOTES 
 
1. See the historical evidence of AT&T foreclosures in Gabel and Weiman (1994). 
2. For a general discussion of network effects and compatibility see Economides (1996).  
3. Of course, besides mandatory interconnection, non-prohibitive interconnection (access) 
fees are necessary so that no company in the network is foreclosed. Non-prohibitive 
interconnection fees is also a goal of the state and federal regulation of 
telecommunications. The literature on access fees in one-sided bottlenecks is large. One 
point of view derives such access fees from monopoly end-to-end services, resulting in the 
‘efficient component pricing rule’ (ECPR) proposed by Baumol and Sidak (1994a, b) and 
Willig (1979). For a critical view of the usefulness of the ECPR in bottleneck cases and for 
a proposal of cost-based access fees for one-sided bottlenecks, see Economides and White 
(1995). 
4. Telecom New Zealand imposed a significant fee for all calls that terminated in its network, 
but refused to pay any fee for calls terminated in competitors’ networks. As a consequence, 
upstart Bell South New Zealand exited the local telecommunications market, and Clear 
remained in the market but has continually refused to pay a significant portion of 
interconnection fees to Telecom New Zealand claiming that if it paid the full 
interconnection fees it would be driven out of business. 
5. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, section 251(b) ‘Each local exchange carrier has the 
following duties: ... (5) The duty to establish reciprocal compensation arrangements for the 
transport and termination of telecommunications’. 
6. See, for example, Radner (2003).  
7. Laffont et al. (1998) analyse a game with the traditional sequence of moves in the Hotelling 
framework. They limit the analysis to the case in which the interconnection fees are set 
exogenously and equal to each other, at a relatively low level. Hence, their analysis cannot 
capture the strategic implications of a network’s ability to control the termination fee that a 
rival network would have to pay—one of the main goals in this paper. These range from 
purely fibre optic technology such as Fibre-to-the-Premise/Home (FTTP/FTTH) to a mix of 
fibre optic and traditional wireline solutions such as Hybrid Fibre Coaxial (HFC), the same 
technology used by cable Internet service providers. 
8. Double marginalisation resulting in higher prices for two vertically disintegrated firms than 
for a merged one was first observed by Cournot (1927). For a discussion of this issue in a 
network setting see Economides and Salop (1992).  
9. It is not crucial whether the two component prices for calls across networks are paid 
directly by the consumer or the consumer pays the originating network for end-to-end 
service and the originating network buys termination services from the other network. 
36 The economics of digital markets 
10. Differentiation in preferences of consumers across networks may arise when the networks 
have brand names that different consumers value differently, or if the networks use 
different technical specifications for which (business) customer’s equipment is more or less 
compatible. Tardiff (1995) reports evidence of brand loyalty toward long distance carriers.  
11. We use the subscript s for the separable case. 
12. This last assumption on the third derivative guarantees that each network’s marginal 
revenue is decreasing. 
13. The quadratic specification can be interpreted as a second-order approximation of any 
general utility function with substitute products. 
14. As is standard in the telecommunication literature, it is assumed that consumers derive no 
utility from receiving calls. 
15. We assume that investment costs are zero. Investment costs that depend on network size, 
( )i iF n , would play a similar role as the parameter λ . 
16. The aggregate demand functions are: 2ii i iiD n x= , and ij i j ijD n n x= , where 
,  1, 2,  i j i j= ≠ . 
17. To see that m os t< , let ( ) ( ) '( )m z x z zx z= +  and ( ) ( ) '( ) / 2M z x z zx z= + . The result 
follows immediately from the fact that ( )M z  and ( )m z are monotone and 
( ) ( ) '( ) / 2 0M z m z zx z− = − > . 
18. This effect was noted by Cournot (1927) in a simpler model with only two complementary 
components. For an application to network industries see Economides (1989). The problem 
is similar to the ‘double marginalisation’ problem that arises when a single good is 
produced by a manufacturer and sold by a retailer (Spengler 1950). 
19. (1)V  is well defined for (0,1]in ∈ . For 
(1)0,in V=  depends i jp q+ , which are not 
uniquely determined. 
20. However, parity fails, i i ip q s+ ≠ , unless marginal costs are equal across networks. 
21. This is in contrast to the results of Laffont et al. (1998) who finds that no corner equilibria 
exist in the case of low switching costs. The difference arises from the fact that they 
assume that the termination fee is low and it is exogenously given. 
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